The theory of subjective expected utility has been recently extended to allow ambiguity to
matter for choice. We propose a notion of absolute ambiguity aversion by building on a …

We introduce a general model of static choice under uncertainty, arguably the weakest
model achieving a separation of cardinal utility and a unique representation of beliefs. Most …

A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known
to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem …

We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in
the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private …

This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions
with independent private values, where the distribution of bidder valuations may be …

This paper develops a payoff equivalence theorem for mechanisms with ambiguity averse
participants with preferences of the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) form (Gilboa and …

We study a mechanism design problem in which an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple
bidders for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other …

We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We
assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are …

Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games
along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about …

We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a
set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player “updates” his …