We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near
stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classical definition of stability by …

We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several
manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to …

In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs,
agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize …

We study one-sided matching problems where $ n $ agents have preferences over $ m $
objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such …

Following up on purely theoretical work, we contribute further theoretical insights into
adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical …

Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We
address this by proposing “incrementalized versions” of Stable Marriage and Stable …

Abstract The Robust Stable Matching (RSM) problem involves finding a stable matching that
allows getting another stable matching within a minimum number of changes when a pair …

In fair rent division, the problem is to assign rooms to roommates and fairly split the rent
based on roommates' reported valuations for the rooms. Envy-free rent division is the most …

Abstract The Robust Stable Marriage problem (RSM) is a variant of the classic Stable
Marriage problem in which the robustness of a given stable matching is measured by the …

We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied
to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and …