Private disclosure with multiple agents

S Zhu - Journal of Economic Theory, 2023 - Elsevier
This study examines a mechanism design problem where the principal can affect the agents'
knowledge of a payoff-relevant state, namely, the principal designs and commits to an …

[PDF][PDF] Screening costly information

J Thereze - 2022 - joao-thereze.github.io
We study screening with endogenous information acquisition. A monopolist offers a menu of
qualitydifferentiated products. After observing the offer, a consumer can costly learn about …

Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents

O Candogan, P Strack - Theoretical Economics, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
We study information design with multiple privately informed agents who interact in a game.
Each agent's utility is linear in a real‐valued state. We show that there always exists an …

Information markets and nonmarkets

D Bergemann, M Ottaviani - Handbook of industrial organization, 2021 - Elsevier
As large amounts of data become available and can be communicated more easily and
processed more effectively, information has come to play a central role for economic activity …

(Reverse) Price Discrimination with Information Design

D Wei, B Green - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024 - pubs.aeaweb.org
A seller markets a good to a customer whose willingness to pay depends on his private type
and the good's quality. The seller designs a screening mechanism that specifies both …

Type-contingent Information Disclosure

T Yamashita, S Zhu - 2021 - publications.ut-capitole.fr
We study a mechanism design problem where the principal can also manipulate the agent's
information about a payoff-relevant state. Jointly designing information and allocation rule is …

Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search

J Lu, Z Wang - Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 - Elsevier
We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can
search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal …

How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms

H Pham - Available at SSRN 4753011, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off
relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of …

Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision

H Guo, W He, B Liu - arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.01453, 2022 - arxiv.org
We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously
because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the …

Auction design with heterogeneous priors

H Pham, T Yamashita - Games and Economic Behavior, 2024 - Elsevier
We consider an auction design problem with private values, where the seller and bidders
may enjoy heterogeneous priors about their (possibly correlated) valuations. Each bidder …