ABSTRACT A risk‐averse entrepreneur with access to a profitable venture needs to raise
funds from investors. She cannot indefinitely commit her human capital to the venture, which …

We extend the neoclassical investment model (Hayashi, 1982) to allow for limited
commitment on compensation contracts. We consider three types of limited commitment:(i) …

This paper considers dynamic moral hazard settings, in which the agent's actions have
consequences over a long horizon. To maintain incentives, the optimal contract defers the …

This paper characterizes the transition dynamics of a continuous-time neoclassical
production economy with capital accumulation in which households face idiosyncratic …

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously
limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively …

This article was prepared for an invited session at the 2015 World Congress of the
Econometric Society. Through a unifying framework, I survey recent developments in the …

The purpose of this paper is to study the optimal retirement and consumption/investment
decisions of an infinitely lived agent who does not tolerate any decline in his/her …

In this paper we study the portfolio selection problem of a finite-lived agent who does not
tolerate a decline in standard of living. The preference can be regarded as exhibiting …

Abstract The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism
Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism …

We develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm
dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield …