We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the
extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' …

A (partially naïve) quasi-hyperbolic discounter repeatedly chooses whether to complete a
task. Her net benefits of task completion are drawn independently between periods from a …

We study the extent to which information can be used to extract attention from a decision
maker (DM). All feasible stopping times $\unicode {x2013} $ random times DM stops paying …

We provide revealed preference characterizations for choices made under various forms of
costly information acquisition. We examine nonseparable, multiplicative, and constrained …

We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite
state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which …

Time inconsistency leads people to revise earlier plans, which has motivated empirical
designs attempting to document such choice revisions. We study identification of time …

Multiple long run players play one amongst multiple possible stage games in each period.
They observe and recall past play and are aware of the current stage game being played …

We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly commit to not
view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their …

A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-
state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen …

Dynamic policy games feature a wide range of equilibria. This paper provides a
methodology for obtaining robust predictions. We begin by focusing on a model of sovereign …