This paper studies secure implementability (T. Saijo, T. Sjostrom and T. Yamato,“Secure
Implementation,” Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, pp. 203-229) in queueing …

This paper investigates the relationship between secure implementability (Saijo et al. in
Theor Econ 2: 203–229, 2007) and full implementability in truthful strategies (Nicolò in Rev …

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007) in divisible
and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions. In these …

This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo et al.(2007)“Secure Implementation,”
Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203–229) in linear production economies with classical …

We study bankruptcy rules in a setting where individuals have state contingent claims. A rule
must distribute shares before uncertainty resolves. Within a wide class of parametric rules …

This paper studies secure implementability [Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato
(2007),“Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203-229] on the provision of …

Mechanisms that are used to characterize Nash implementable social choice
correspondences (SCC) have unattractive features since they have to cover every instances …

PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS AND A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF EFFICIENT
BILATERAL NETWORK A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIV Page 1 …

In linear production economies, Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) characterized Pareto-
efficient and group strategy-proof rules. This paper shows an alternative characterization of …

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless
agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to …