Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria
B Peng, A Rubinstein - Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant ε> 0, obtains ε
T-swap regret within only T=(n) rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the …
T-swap regret within only T=(n) rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the …
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
Y Babichenko, A Rubinstein - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
For a constant ϵ, we prove a (N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication
complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action …
complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action …
Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games
Y Babichenko, A Rubinstein - Proceedings of the 53rd annual ACM …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We consider (i) the problem of finding a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in congestion
games, and (ii) the problem of finding an (exponential precision) fixed point of the gradient …
games, and (ii) the problem of finding an (exponential precision) fixed point of the gradient …
Envy-free cake-cutting for four agents
A Hollender, A Rubinstein - 2023 IEEE 64th Annual Symposium …, 2023 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and
represented as the 0,1 interval, and a set of n agents with heterogeneous preferences over …
represented as the 0,1 interval, and a set of n agents with heterogeneous preferences over …
Near-optimal communication lower bounds for approximate nash equilibria
M Goos, A Rubinstein - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021 - SIAM
Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approximate Nash Equilibria Page 1 Copyright
© by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. SIAM J. COMPUT. © 2021 …
© by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. SIAM J. COMPUT. © 2021 …
Informational bounds on equilibria (a survey)
Y Babichenko - ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2020 - dl.acm.org
Query complexity and communication complexity of equilibria have been actively studied in
the past decade. Recent progress in these fields of informational complexity has led to a …
the past decade. Recent progress in these fields of informational complexity has led to a …
Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions
A Rubinstein, Z Zhou - arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.12444, 2023 - arxiv.org
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item
Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity …
Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity …
Complexity theory, game theory, and economics: The barbados lectures
T Roughgarden - Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical …, 2020 - nowpublishers.com
The goal of this monograph is twofold:(i) to explain how complexity theory has helped
illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory, and (ii) to illustrate how …
illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory, and (ii) to illustrate how …
The randomized communication complexity of randomized auctions
A Rubinstein, J Zhao - Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between
a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items …
a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items …
New Separations and Beyond-Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory and Submodular Optimization
J Zhao - 2024 - search.proquest.com
In algorithmic game theory, we analyze games and design mechanisms through
computational lens. We prefer mechanisms that are simple, deterministic and incentive …
computational lens. We prefer mechanisms that are simple, deterministic and incentive …