Bayesian persuasion and information design
E Kamenica - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …
Markets for information: An introduction
D Bergemann, A Bonatti - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a
comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers …
comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers …
Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data markets
When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In
such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is …
such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is …
Bayesian persuasion
E Kamenica, M Gentzkow - American Economic Review, 2011 - aeaweb.org
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a
symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who …
symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who …
Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …
The design and price of information
A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private
information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for …
information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for …
Suspense and surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive
entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the …
entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the …
Implementing the “wisdom of the crowd”
We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and
choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by …
choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by …
The economics of ownership, access and trade in digital data
Despite the rapidly growing volume and economic importance of data in the digital
economy, the legal framework for data ownership, access and trade remains incompletely …
economy, the legal framework for data ownership, access and trade remains incompletely …
Selling cookies
D Bergemann, A Bonatti - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015 - aeaweb.org
We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a
large database that contains information about the match value between individual …
large database that contains information about the match value between individual …