Bayesian persuasion and information design

E Kamenica - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …

Markets for information: An introduction

D Bergemann, A Bonatti - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a
comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers …

Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data markets

D Acemoglu, A Makhdoumi, A Malekian… - American Economic …, 2022 - aeaweb.org
When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In
such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is …

Bayesian persuasion

E Kamenica, M Gentzkow - American Economic Review, 2011 - aeaweb.org
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a
symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who …

Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

A Kolotilin, T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk, M Li - Econometrica, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …

The design and price of information

D Bergemann, A Bonatti, A Smolin - American economic review, 2018 - aeaweb.org
A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private
information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for …

Suspense and surprise

J Ely, A Frankel, E Kamenica - Journal of Political Economy, 2015 - journals.uchicago.edu
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive
entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the …

Implementing the “wisdom of the crowd”

I Kremer, Y Mansour, M Perry - Journal of Political Economy, 2014 - journals.uchicago.edu
We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and
choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by …

The economics of ownership, access and trade in digital data

N Duch-Brown, B Martens, F Mueller-Langer - 2017 - papers.ssrn.com
Despite the rapidly growing volume and economic importance of data in the digital
economy, the legal framework for data ownership, access and trade remains incompletely …

Selling cookies

D Bergemann, A Bonatti - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015 - aeaweb.org
We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a
large database that contains information about the match value between individual …