This chapter reviews recent developments in the extensive and growing experimental
literature on coordination games. Coordination is necessary whenever there exist multiple …

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender with private information
provides verifiable but potentially vague information (ie, about the quality of a product) to a …

Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-
intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but …

Proof-of-work puzzles and CAPTCHAS consume enormous amounts of energy and time.
These techniques are examples of resource burning: verifiable consumption of resources …

On-demand provisioning in the cloud allows for services to remain available despite
massive denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Unfortunately, on-demand provisioning is …

We examine how preplay communication and clustering affect play in a challenging hybrid
experimental game on networks. Free-form chat is impressively effective in achieving the …

We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research
demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but …

The analysis of dynamic games hinges on assumptions about players' actions and beliefs at
information sets that are not expected to be reached during game play. Under the standard …

This paper investigates the coordination failure that arises from combining two small pre-
existing groups and focuses on the reaction of group members to this change in …

Abstract The Dixit (Econ J 90: 95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in
capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J …