Tackling real-world socio-economic challenges requires designing and testing economic
policies. However, this is hard in practice, due to a lack of appropriate (micro-level) …

Auction theory is of central importance in the study of markets. Unfortunately, we do not
know equilibrium bidding strategies for most auction games. For realistic markets with …

Abstract The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction …

Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)
mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple …

Renewable natural capital—terrestrial and marine ecosystems, fisheries, biodiversity, and
fresh water—is in decline around the world, affecting the livelihoods of millions of people …

Algorithmic pricing on online e-commerce platforms raises the concern of tacit collusion,
where reinforcement learning algorithms learn to set collusive prices in a decentralized …

We introduce the use of reinforcement learning for indirect mechanisms, working with the
existing class of sequential price mechanisms, which generalizes both serial dictatorship …

We present a new algorithm for computing pure-strategy ε-Bayes-Nash equilibria (ε-BNEs)
in combinatorial auctions. The main innovation of our algorithm is to separate the algorithm's …

We present a best-response based algorithm for computing verifiable $\varepsilon $-perfect
Bayesian equilibria for sequential auctions with combinatorial bidding spaces and …

Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-
compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of …