We study optimal compensation in a dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in
multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate …

We examine an infinitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority
to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are …

This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moral hazard,
and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based …

We study a continuous‐time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal
has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract …

We extend the neoclassical investment model (Hayashi, 1982) to allow for limited
commitment on compensation contracts. We consider three types of limited commitment:(i) …

We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking
incentives in addition to effort incentives. We show that the optimal contract protects the CEO …

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via
short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract …

We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a continuous-time moral-
hazard problem and study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent …

We quantify the real implications of trade-offs between firm information disclosure and long-
term investment efficiency. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which firm …

This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited
liability constraint. The agent's effort is his private information and affects output …