This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …

A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both
strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst …

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

Strategy-proof mechanisms eliminate the possibility for gain from strategic misrepresentation
of preferences. If market participants respond optimally, these mechanisms permit the …

Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated
strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school …

Using a rich data set on Australian college admissions, we show that even in strategically
straightforward situations, a non-negligible fraction of applicants adopt strategies that are …

We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the
performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. We find that deferred …

It matters whether real-world mechanisms are simple. If participants cannot see that a
mechanism is incentive-compatible, they may refuse to participate or may behave in ways …

A mechanism is said to be strategy-proof if no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her
true preferences. This property is considered highly desirable for mechanisms that are used …

The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful
preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In …