The paper develops an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics and shows the
following:(1) the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to …

This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman's approach to regulation by incorporating a
legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications …

This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and
the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect …

Conclusion This paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for
congressional dominance of agency decisions. My thesis is twofold. First, because much of …

This article presents an empirical analysis of the National Labor Relations Board, focusing
on the balance the agency strikes between the interests of business and labor. It is oriented …

The positive theory of" congressional dominance" argues that Congress controls the
bureaucracy. This article offers a critical assessment, in two parts. The first outlines the …

An examination of theoretical, conceptual, and empirical analyses of bureaucratic
responsiveness reveals that, despite years of research, there is considerable confusion and …

This article is, on one hand, a survey of the core theoretical literature on the economics of
public regulation; and, on the other hand, a cohesive discussion about how the literature has …

Previous studies consider the revolving door to be a static concept. However, the impact of
the revolving door may vary over a regulator's career; that is, the revolving door may be …

The Political Economy of Expertise is a carefully argued examination of how legislatures use
expert research and testimony. Kevin Esterling demonstrates that interest groups can …