We study the provision problem of an asymmetrically valued public project using a novel
mechanism proposed by Van Essen and Walker. Under this mechanism, each player …

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and
whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We …

We argue that since allocation mechanisms will not always be in equilibrium, their out-of-
equilibrium properties must be taken into account along with their properties in equilibrium …

An incentive mechanism is designed to achieve desired outcomes as Nash equilibrium, by
assuming agents to be fully rational. Nevertheless, practical agents may violate this …

This paper considers a moral hazard in teams model in which a principal knows that the
agents she compensates are identical and independent, but does not know all of the actions …

A principal provides nondiscriminatory incentives for independent and identical agents. The
principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions …

In the simplest (generic) case the fixed point index assigns an index of+ 1 or-1 to each fixed
point of a function or correspondence, and these indices sum to+ 1. If an isolated equilibrium …

This paper introduces a new incentive‐compatible mechanism which, for general preference
environments, implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. We provide an example …

Given a parameterized model of preferences, what choice data or experiment would identify
an agent's parameter value in that model? Similarly, what data would be sufficient for testing …

We provide a mechanism, the Nash equilibria of which coincide with the Lindahl allocations
with two personalized prices in an economy that may display warm-glow preferences. The …