This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in a
project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts are …

We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich new data set
describing back-and-forth sequential bargaining occurring in over 25 million listings from …

A firm considers hiring an agent who may be competent for a potential project or not. The
agent can prove her competence but faces a holdup problem. We propose a model of …

I study a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a
project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' efforts, and it generates …

This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only
its own contribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with …

We study the Markov equilibria of a model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents
choose between private consumption and irreversible contributions to a durable public …

Charitable contributions are frequently made over time. Donors are free to contribute
whenever they wish and as often as they want, and are frequently updated on the level of …

I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose
marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with …

Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then
bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee …

How does collusion start? This paper studies the emergence of collusion in the presence of
multimarket contacts. It analyzes price fixing among the three main retail pharmacy chains in …