This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …

For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values,
the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) …

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In classical secretary problems, a sequence of $ n $ elements arrive in a uniformly random
order, and we want to choose a single item, or a set of size $ K $. The random order model …

We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of
potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not …

This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online
algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an …

The competitive auction was first proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright. In their paper,
they introduce the competitive analysis framework of online algorithm designing into the …

We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model
includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching …

Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose
values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings …

We consider the problem of maximizing the expected revenue from selling $ k $
homogeneous goods to $ n $ unit-demand buyers who arrive sequentially with independent …