We show that Brazilian voters strongly sanction malfeasant mayors when presented with
hypothetical scenarios but take no action when given the same information about their own …

Effective policy-making requires that voters avoid electing malfeasant politicians. However,
informing voters of incumbent malfeasance in corrupt contexts may not reduce incumbent …

Politicians shirk when their performance is obscure to constituents. We theorize that when
politician performance information is disseminated early in the electoral term, politicians will …

How do social networks moderate the way political information influences electoral
accountability? We propose a simple model in which incumbent malfeasance revelations …

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its
salutary effect on incumbents' electoral incentives. We argue that political competition …

Holding politicians accountable through reelection has long been a focus of empirical
research, yet results are mixed in terms of whether electoral accountability works in practice …

As new information technologies facilitate the production and dissemination of broadcast
media, entertainment-education interventions are increasingly used in attempts to influence …

This short report exploits a unique opportunity to investigate the implications of response
bias in survey questions about voter turnout and vote choice in new democracies. We …

Mosquito-borne illnesses present significant health challenges to the developing world. If
citizens are informed about their government's efforts to combat these diseases, will they …

This article details the challenges we faced in collecting sensitive information in an
ethnically and religiously divided community that has experienced recent violence. The …