We consider fractional hedonic games, a subclass of coalition formation games that can be
succinctly modeled by means of a graph in which nodes represent agents and edge weights …

We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games,
where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition …

We study strategic games inspired by Schelling's seminal model of residential segregation.
These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into …

Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost
every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic …

In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs,
agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize …

The core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended to model
coalition formation such as hedonic games. The fact that the number of deviating agents …

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received
considerable attention in the literature. They are coalition formation games among selfish …

Local Core Stability in Simple Symmetric Fractional Hedonic Games Page 1 Local Core
Stability in Simple Symmetric Fractional Hedonic Games Raffaello Carosi Gran Sasso …

Coalition formation is a central problem in multi-agent systems and has been extensively
studied, ever since the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games …

We consider the online version of the coalition structure generation problem, in which
agents, corresponding to the vertices of a graph, appear in an online fashion and have to be …