We study the problem of screening in decision-making processes under uncertainty, while
focusing on the impact of adding an additional screening stage, commonly known as a …

A patient seller interacts with a sequence of myopic consumers. Each period, the seller
chooses the quality of his product, and a consumer decides whether to trust the seller after …

We study the implications of endogenous pricing for learning and welfare in the classic
herding model. When prices are determined exogenously, it is known that learning occurs if …

Seed fundraising for ventures often takes place by sequentially approaching potential
contributors, whose decisions are observed by other contributors. The fundraising succeeds …

Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each
agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and …

Consider a market with two substitute products and a sequence of consumers. The
consumers are uncertain about the quality of each product but obtain some private …

We consider a dynamic market with two firms that sell competing common-value products.
The firms offer both products to an infinite set of rational consumers. Each consumer …

Sellers often launch a new product with different pricequality packages (versions) when
social learning is prevalent. Yet few papers explain the seller's versioning incentive from a …

Will people eventually learn the value of an asset through observable information? This
paper studies observational learning in a market with competitive prices. Comparing a …

Two firms produce substitute goods with unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices
and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both …