We survey the experimental literature on communication of private information via cheap-
talk messages. The focus is on work that is firmly grounded in theory. We discuss the …

Appointed leaders of administrative agencies routinely record subdelegations of
governmental authority to civil servants. That appointees willingly cede authority in this way …

Theories of legislative committees, lobbying, and cue‐taking assume information affects
legislators' support for policy alternatives. However, there is little direct, empirical evidence …

We present an informational theory of public protests, according to which public protests
allow citizens to aggregate privately dispersed information and signal it to the policy maker …

We experimentally investigate whether competition stimulates information revelation, by
comparing two Bayesian persuasion models. One model has one sender (Kamenica and …

In presidential democracies with strong party systems, the congress shares legis-lative
powers with the executive, and parties strongly influence the behavior of legislators. The law …

We experimentally investigate the effect of a second opinion on information transmission.
Our design varies the number of senders as well as the alignment and magnitude of …

We present an informational theory of petitions and public protests that can be implemented
in an experiment with a finite number of players, according to which petitions allow citizens …

Unbiased Publication Bias: Theory and Evidence Page 1 Unbiased Publication Bias: Theory and
Evidence Chishio Furukawa BITSS Annual Meeting December 6, 2017 Page 2 Need for …

We perform a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition within a
strategic communication environment. Two equally informed senders with conflicting …