Computational methods in environmental and resource economics

Y Cai - Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
Computational methods are required to solve problems without closed-form solutions in
environmental and resource economics. Efficiency, stability, and accuracy are key elements …

Sovereign debt and structural reforms

A Müller, K Storesletten, F Zilibotti - American Economic Review, 2019 - aeaweb.org
We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited
enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth …

Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal‐agent problems

O Kadan, PJ Reny, JM Swinkels - Econometrica, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
We provide general conditions under which principal‐agent problems with either one or
multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our results cover as …

Randomisation with moral hazard: a path to existence of optimal contracts

D Kršek, D Possamaï - arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.13278, 2023 - arxiv.org
We study a generic principal-agent problem in continuous time on a finite time horizon. We
introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and …

An exact optimization approach to the principal-agent problem in infrastructure projects via PPPs

C Gomez, D Castiblanco, JM Lozano… - International Journal of …, 2020 - Taylor & Francis
PPPs are a compelling mechanism for infrastructure procurement but are vulnerable to the
principal-agent problem due to the divergence in the parties' utility functions. This research …

Regulating deferred incentive pay

F Hoffmann, R Inderst, M Opp - 2015 - econstor.eu
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments
and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent …

Games in Intrinsic Form with Witsenhausen Model

D Kadnikov - 2020 - pastel.hal.science
In a strategic context, information (who knows what and before whom) plays a crucial role. In
this thesis, we consider game theory models with information, and we present a new model …

Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem

DI Singham - European Journal of Operational Research, 2019 - Elsevier
We develop a method for finding approximate solutions to the continuous agent type
principal-agent problem when analytical methods are not available. The solution is …

Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach

R Ke, CT Ryan - Operations Research, 2018 - pubsonline.informs.org
We develop a simple sufficient condition for an optimal contract of a moral hazard problem to
be monotone in the output signal. Existing results on monotonicity require conditions on the …

Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

R Kirkegaard - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
The “spanning condition” describes a situation where the agent's effort determines the
weights placed on two distinct technologies. Sufficient conditions are known under which the …