Computational methods in environmental and resource economics
Y Cai - Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
Computational methods are required to solve problems without closed-form solutions in
environmental and resource economics. Efficiency, stability, and accuracy are key elements …
environmental and resource economics. Efficiency, stability, and accuracy are key elements …
Sovereign debt and structural reforms
We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited
enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth …
enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth …
Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal‐agent problems
We provide general conditions under which principal‐agent problems with either one or
multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our results cover as …
multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our results cover as …
Randomisation with moral hazard: a path to existence of optimal contracts
D Kršek, D Possamaï - arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.13278, 2023 - arxiv.org
We study a generic principal-agent problem in continuous time on a finite time horizon. We
introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and …
introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and …
An exact optimization approach to the principal-agent problem in infrastructure projects via PPPs
PPPs are a compelling mechanism for infrastructure procurement but are vulnerable to the
principal-agent problem due to the divergence in the parties' utility functions. This research …
principal-agent problem due to the divergence in the parties' utility functions. This research …
Regulating deferred incentive pay
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments
and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent …
and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent …
Games in Intrinsic Form with Witsenhausen Model
D Kadnikov - 2020 - pastel.hal.science
In a strategic context, information (who knows what and before whom) plays a crucial role. In
this thesis, we consider game theory models with information, and we present a new model …
this thesis, we consider game theory models with information, and we present a new model …
Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem
DI Singham - European Journal of Operational Research, 2019 - Elsevier
We develop a method for finding approximate solutions to the continuous agent type
principal-agent problem when analytical methods are not available. The solution is …
principal-agent problem when analytical methods are not available. The solution is …
Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
We develop a simple sufficient condition for an optimal contract of a moral hazard problem to
be monotone in the output signal. Existing results on monotonicity require conditions on the …
be monotone in the output signal. Existing results on monotonicity require conditions on the …
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
R Kirkegaard - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
The “spanning condition” describes a situation where the agent's effort determines the
weights placed on two distinct technologies. Sufficient conditions are known under which the …
weights placed on two distinct technologies. Sufficient conditions are known under which the …