More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature
W Güth, MG Kocher - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014 - Elsevier
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to
provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game …
provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game …
Bonus payments and reference point violations
We investigate how bonus payments affect the satisfaction and performance of managers in
a large multinational company. We find that falling behind a natural reference standard for a …
a large multinational company. We find that falling behind a natural reference standard for a …
On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict
We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study
experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation …
experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation …
The effect of stake size in experimental bargaining and distribution games: A survey
E Karagözoğlu, ÜB Urhan - Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017 - Springer
We review the literature on bargaining and distribution experiments to investigate whether
changes in stake size have significant effects on behaviour in laboratory/field settings. We …
changes in stake size have significant effects on behaviour in laboratory/field settings. We …
Unobserved-offers bargaining
A Wolitzky - American Economic Review, 2023 - aeaweb.org
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers
must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players' preferences are common …
must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players' preferences are common …
Strategic risk and response time across games
Experimental data for two types of bargaining games are used to study the role of strategic
risk in the decision making process that takes place when subjects play a game only once …
risk in the decision making process that takes place when subjects play a game only once …
Will you accept without knowing what? The Yes-No game in the newspaper and in the lab
W Güth, O Kirchkamp - Experimental Economics, 2012 - Springer
In this paper we compare behaviour in a newspaper experiment with behaviour in the
laboratory. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the …
laboratory. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the …
Purely procedural preferences-beyond procedural equity and reciprocity
N Chlaß, W Güth, T Miettinen - European Journal of Political Economy, 2019 - Elsevier
We conduct experiments in which parties face a pair of two-player pie-splitting procedures.
Parties submit their strategy in each, their beliefs about their opponent's choices, and are …
Parties submit their strategy in each, their beliefs about their opponent's choices, and are …
Does laboratory trading mirror behavior in real world markets? Fair bargaining and competitive bidding on eBay
GE Bolton, A Ockenfels - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014 - Elsevier
Laboratory market experiments observe a sharp dichotomy between (selfish) competitive
behavior and fair-minded social behavior depending on competitive conditions. While the …
behavior and fair-minded social behavior depending on competitive conditions. While the …
Lying about the price? Ultimatum bargaining with messages and imperfectly observed offers
N Anbarcı, N Feltovich, MY Gürdal - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2015 - Elsevier
We introduce the taxicab game, related to the ultimatum game and Gehrig et al.'s (2007)
yes/no game. The proposer makes an offer, and simultaneously sends a cheap talk …
yes/no game. The proposer makes an offer, and simultaneously sends a cheap talk …