Is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed
effectively, whereas others are not? The transaction costs of defining the property rights to …

Reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases may be almost impossible without a green
transition—a substantial transformation of consumption and production patterns. To study …

We develop an endogenous growth model in which clean and dirty technologies compete in
production. Research can be directed to either technology. If dirty technologies are more …

This survey investigates the increasing importance of global public goods (GPGs) in today's
interdependent world, driven by ever-growing, cross-border externalities and public good …

We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We
classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages …

Free-riding is at the core of environmental problems. If a climate coalition reduces its
emissions, world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more; they may also …

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in
which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible …

“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” So argued ecologist Garrett Hardin in “The
Tragedy of the Commons” in the 13 December 1968 issue of Science (1). Hardin questioned …

This paper analyzes a framework in which countries over time pollute and invest in green
technologies. Without a climate treaty, the countries pollute too much and invest too little …

Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We
study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use in the …