Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

We investigate the optimal design of a generalized lottery contest that incorporates the
possibility of draws. The designer can impose identity-dependent treatments–ie …

We introduce and axiomatize a class of single‐winner contest success functions that
embody the possibility of a draw. We then analyze the game of contest that our success …

We study winner‐pay Tullock contests with a no‐win parameter that reflects the likelihood
that nobody will win the contest, in a symmetric model with complete information. We show …

We study n symmetric agents engaged in simultaneous k-dimensional contests. We
demonstrate that there is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when there are a sufficient …

This study presents a novel contest model in which interest groups compete for partially
exclusive rents, and the number of winners is endogenous. Partial exclusivity can explain …

This paper investigates Tullock group contests with the possibility of a draw in which the
winner, if any, shares the prize with other players in his group, and each group's sharing rule …

We consider two-player contests with the possibility of ties and study the effect of different tie-
breaking rules on effort. For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit pure-strategy …

We investigate the temporal structure that maximizes the winner's effort in large
homogeneous contests. We find that the winner's effort ranges from a lower bound of 0 to an …

We study k $ dimensional contests wherein each of the k sub $ contests the η agents
compete against each other in a Tullock contest. The designer who wishes to maximize the …