Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication
KJS Zollman, CT Bergstrom… - Proceedings of the …, 2013 - royalsocietypublishing.org
Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when
interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest
communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is
at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of
experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.
interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest
communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is
at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of
experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.
[PDF][PDF] Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially
KJS Zollman, CT Bergstrom, SM Huttegger - 2012 - faculty.sites.uci.edu
Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when
interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest
communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is
at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of
experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.
interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest
communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is
at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of
experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.
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