We investigate whether physicians' financial incentives influence health care supply,
technology diffusion, and resulting patient outcomes. In 1997, Medicare consolidated the …

This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and
physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment …

We analyze Medicare's influence on private insurers' payments for physicians' services.
Using a large administrative change in reimbursements for surgical versus medical care, we …

Unintended overpayment of some services, in combination with other market factors, is
driving increased use of expensive care, which in turn could be an important driver of health …

The purpose of this paper is to examine how physicians respond to changes in payment
levels from government insurers. Our analysis focuses on two issues: controlling overall …

Many policy makers believe that when Medicare constrains its payment rates for hospital
inpatient care, private insurers end up paying higher rates as a result. I tested this “cost …

The demand inducement hypothesis predicts that physicians will respond to reductions in
their income by increasing the volume of their services when the income effect is strong and …

One commonly held explanation for high and rising health care costs in the United States
points to the market power of health care providers. This third article of a 4-part series …

We study the design of provider incentives in the post‐acute care setting—a high‐stakes but
under‐studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long‐term care hospitals …

Background The Medicare program fundamentally changed its system of payment for
physicians' services in 1992. Controversy over the new Medicare fee schedule has focused …